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Imputed Contributory Negligence
Fleming James, Jr.*
Our system of liability based on fault is part of an economic
and social philosophy of individualism. Quite naturally then
an individual is generally held only for his own fault and not for
the fault of another. Innocent A is not usually liable for injuries
caused by guilty B. It is a commonplace, however, that he sometimes is. That is where there is a relationship between A and B
to which the law attaches the consequences of vicarious liability.
Such relationships are those between master and servant, and
persons engaged in a partnership or a joint enterprise. Where
the servant, for instance, acting within the scope of his employment negligently injured C, the innocent master, A, is liable to
C for that injury. This result. is usually described by identifying
master and servant. Qui facit per alium facit per se. This means
that the servant's negligence is imputed to the master.'
The case put does not involve contributory negligence. C has
been the innocent victim of B's fault (else he would be barred of
recovery by his own negligence). But let us shift the case slightly.
Suppose that C has negligently run into and destroyed A's truck,
and that A's driver, B, was also negligent but A was in all respects
free from fault. A now sues C for the damage to his truck. By
hypothesis he cannot be barred from recovery by his own negligence, for there was none. And under general principles the innocent victim has the choice of suing either or both of two persons
whose wrongs contributed to his injury. The question here is
whether A is to be barred for the negligence of his employee, B.
The law today says he is. Here again the result is described by
identifying master and servant and imputing the latter's negli0 Lafayette S. Foster Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. The problems of vicarious liability, collaterally involved

here, are

treated in, e.g., Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk,
38 Yale L.J. 584 (1929); Holmes, Agency, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 345 (1891), 5 Harv.
L. Rev. 1 (1891); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 Yale L.J. 105
(1916); Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," Harv. Leg. Essays
433 (1934); Y. B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 Col. L. Rev. 474, 716 (1923);
Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 315, 383, 441 (1894);
Baty, Vicarious Liability (1916). Cf. Steffen, Independent Contractor and
the Good Life, 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 501 (1935); Restatement, Agency §§ 219
et seq. (1933).
[340]
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gence to the innocent master. The same result is reached where
B is a partner or a joint entrepreneur of A, and B's negligence
occurs within the scope of such relationship. This result is
2
generally called imputed contributory negligence.
So far we have been dealing with relationships wherein B's
negligence will be imputed to A whether A is plaintiff or defendant. The rule of imputation here works both ways, so that it
meets what has been called the "both-ways test."'8 Formerly,
however, there were many relationships in which the law imputed B's negligence to A if A was plaintiff but not if A was
defendant. Rules of this kind have been largely repudiated. First
we shall examine these rules and the development which led to
the wide current acceptance of the both-ways test with its appealing formal consistency. But that is only part of the story. In
recent years there has been both judicial and legislative expansion of vicarious liability-particularly in the automobile accident
field. 4 This poses the further question whether the both-ways
test should be applied so as to expand likewise the defense of
contributory negligence (by imputing it in relationships where
the pre-existing law did not)-a result which would expand an
impediment to liability pari passu with the expansion of liability
itself. This in turn will call for a re-evaluation of the both-ways
test to see whether its formal symmetry may not conceal an
equal treatment for policies that are diametrically opposed to
each other, so that it tends to be self-defeating.5 If that is the
case, still further questions arise: Should the both-ways test be
abandoned? Is it likely to be progressively abandoned? If it is,
what factors should be considered in determining whether and
when contributory negligence should be imputed? And finally,
2. See in general Gilmore, Imputed Negligence, 1 Wis. L. Rev. 193, 257
(1921); Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or Child
in an Action for Loss of Services, etc., 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 173 (1935);
Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41 Yale L.J.
831 (1932); Keeton, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 13 Texas L. Rev. 161
(1935); Lessler, The Proposed Discard of the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory Negligence, 20 Ford. L. Rev. 156 (1951); Notes, 17 Corn. L.Q. 158 (1931);

24 Mich. L. Rev. 592 (1926); 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1123 (1932); 33 B.U.L. Rev.
90 (1953); 32 Am. L. Reg. 763 (1893); 11 A.L.R. 2d 1437 (1950).
3. This apt phrase is used by Gregory in his articles cited in note 2
supra. See also Note, 32 Am. L. Reg. 763, 765 (1893) ("It is a poor rule that
won't work both ways.").
4. See discussion in Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228 Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711
(1949); authorities cited note 2 supra.
5. See, e.g., Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or
Child In an Action for Loss of Services, etc., 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 173, 177,
178 (1935).
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should the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence be retained at all?O
Distinctions to Be Made
As a preliminary matter, certain distinctions should be made.
Plaintiff may himself have been guilty of a negligent act or omission which contributed to the injury. Such negligence may consist in:
(a)

An actual exercise of control over another person (e.g.,
7
the driver of a vehicle) as by urging him to speed.

(b)

A negligent failure to exercise control over another
when there is actual chance for such control and the
failure to exercise it is fraught with unreasonable harm
to plaintiff." Thus an automobile passenger may be
negligent in taking no step to prevent his driver from
running into an obvious obstruction.9

(c)

The negligent entrusting of one's self or one's property
to another whom the plaintiff ought to have known to
be incompetent.' 0

In any such case, plaintiff will be barred by his own negligence even though the situation is not one where the other person's negligence will be imputed to him. It is where no ground
of plaintiff's personal negligence appears that the question of
imputed negligence becomes important.
There are other situations where an innocent plaintiff's
recovery may be affected by the negligence of another person
through doctrines technically distinct from the imputation of
negligence. These are involved in actions for loss of services of
6. Most of the authorities cited in note 2 supra discuss this point. See
particularly Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or
Child in an Action for Loss of Services, etc., 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 173 (1935);
Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41 Yale L.J.
831 (1932); Lessler, Proposed Discard of the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory Negligence, 20 Ford. L. Rev. 156 (1951); Note, 17 Corn. L.Q. 158 (1931).
7. See discussion in Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499, 507 (Ex. 1840);
Little v. Hackett, 116 U.S. 366, 372 (1886). Cf. note 22 infra.
8. In general, see Harper and Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct
of Another, 43 Yale L.J. 886 (1934); James, Scope of Duty in Negligence
Cases, 47 N.W. L. Rev. 778, 809 (1953). But cf. Painter v. Lingon, 193 Va. 840,
71 S.E.2d 355 (1952); note 28 infra.
9. E.g., Boscarello v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 112 Conn. 279, 152 Atl.
61 (1930); Glick v. Baer, 186 Wis. 268, 201 N.W. 752 (1925).
10. E.g., Wilson v. Hill, 103 Colo. 409, 86 P.2d 1084 (1939); Garrity v.
Mangan, 232 Iowa 1188, 6 N.W.2d 292 (1942). In these cases contributory
negligence and assumption of risk often overlap. See James, Assumption of
Risk, 61 Yale L.J. 141, 149 et seq. (1952).
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another (wife, child, etc.); for expenses incurred on behalf of
another; or for the wrongful death of another.
Driver and Passenger
In Thorogood v. Bryan" an English court imputed the negligence of the driver of a public omnibus to his passenger, so as to
bar an action for the passenger's death brought against the owner
of another omnibus which negligently contributed to the accident.
A similar rule would no doubt have been applied to the passenger
on a railroad train,1 2 or a vessel,' 8 or a private conveyance.' 4 The
rule came to have some following in this country, 15 though other
courts rejected it from the first.' 6 The judges who decided the
Thorogood case thought that the passenger should be "identified"
with the driver because (1) he had selected, and entrusted himself to the driver and to this mode of conveyance (thus taking
upon himself the driver's faults);17 (2) he had a measure of
control since he had "employed" the owner to drive him and "If
he is dissatisfied with the mode of conveyance, he is not obliged
to avail himself of it";'5 (3) it would be "strange" to impose upon
the defendant greater liability to the passenger than to the owner
of the very same conveyance.' 9 These reasons were for the most
part repeated in the American cases following the rule. 20 They
did not, however, long prevail. Thorogood v. Bryan was over11. 8 C.B. (Man. G. & S.) 114 (C.P. 1849).
12. See Bridge v. Grand Junction Ry., 3 M. & W. 244 (Ex. 1838) (and
treatment of this decision in Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. [Man. G. & S.] 114
[C.P. 1849)); Armstrong v. Lancashire & Y. R. Co., L.R. 10 Ex. 47 (1875);
Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Pa. 151 (1863).
13. Cattlin v. Hills, 8 C.B. (Man. G. & S.) 123 (argued with the Thorogood
case) (C.P. 1849).
14. L.S. & M.S. R. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274 (1872); Carlisle v. Town of
Sheldon, 38 Vt. 440 (1866); Prideaux v. City of Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513
(1878).
15. Brown v. New York Cent. R.R., 31 Barb. 385 (N.Y. 1860) (passenger
in stagecoach); Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Pa. 151 (1863) (passenger in
train); cases cited note 14 supra. Wisconsin limited its rule to passengers
in a private conveyance.
16. Little v. Hackett, 116 U.S. 366 (1885); Danville, L. & N.T. R.R. v.
Stewart, 59 Ky. 119 (1859); Bennett v. New Jersey R. & T. Co., 36 N.J.L. 225
(1873); Chapman v. New Haven R.R., 19 N.Y. 341 (1859); Transfer Co. v.
Kelly, 36 Ohio 86 (1880). Contrast the Chapman case with Brown v. New
York Cent. R.R., 31 Barb. 385 (N.Y. 1860).
17. Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. (Man. G. & S.) 114, 130, 131, 132 (C.P. 1849).
18. Id. at 132.
19. Id. at 132, 133.
20. See cases noted 14, 15, supra. In Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Pa. 151
(1863), however, the Pennsylvania court expressed dissatisfaction with the
reasoning in Thorogood and found a better basis for the rule in holding the
carrier alone responsible "as an incentive to care and diligence." Id. at 164.
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ruled in England and widely repudiated in this country, even in
2
states which originally followed it. 1
The reasoning involved in this repudiation was as follows:
(1) there was no real control or chance to control by the passenger in these cases generally;2 2 (2) the passenger should not be
penalized for the perfectly lawful and reasonable act of selecting
this mode of conveyance or this driver; 23 (3) since the negligence
of the driver would not be imputed to the passenger in a suit by
an injured third person against the passenger, or in a suit by the
passenger against the driver's master, there was no general principle of law that would support the imputation in all cases and
therefore it would be "against all legal rules" to impute it to
him in this situation.24 It will be seen that this reasoning includes
an application of the both-ways test.
While Thorogood v. Bryan is dead today, its spirit has had a
partial and unhappy reincarnation in the modern doctrine of joint
enterprise. 25 In theory this doctrine is one of general application,
involves ordinary notions of agency, and meets the both-ways
test. 26 There has been, however, a modern extension of it which
21. Mills v. Armstrong, "The Bernina," 13 App. Cas. 1 (H.L. 1888); cases
cited note 16 supra; cases collected in Note, 90 A.L.R. 630 (1934); Gordon v.
Hartwick, 325 Mich. 534, 39 N.W.2d 61 (1949); Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. 363,
21 Atl. 31 (1891); Reiter v. Grober, 173 Wis. 493, 181 N.W. 739 (1921).
A collection of older cases is found in Note, 32 Am. L. Reg. 763 (1893).
22. It was conceded, of course, that if the passenger actually exercised
control in a specific case, and did so negligently, that this might bar his
recovery. Little v. Hackett, 116 U.S. 366, 372 (1886); New York, L.E. & W.
R.R. v. Steinbrenner, 47 N.J.L. 161, 170 (1885). The latter opinion graphically
portrays the impracticability and undesirability of control by passengers in
a public vehicle.
See also Note, 32 Am. L. Reg. 763, 764 (1893).
23. Mills v. Armstrong, "The Bernina," 13 App. Cas. 1, 8 (H.L. 1888);
Little v. Hackett, 116 U.S. 366, 379 (1886). Compare note 47 Infra.
In any given case, denial of liability could be predicated on the passenger's own negligence in selecting a driver known to be, or observably,
incompetent, if the facts warranted it. None of the cases here involved any
such showing. But cf. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Barr, 307 Ky.
28, 209 S.W.2d 719 (1948) (where such negligence on the part of the passenger
was found).
24. Little v. Hackett, 116 U.S. 366, 375-377 (1886).
25. See, e.g., Weintraub, The Joint Enterprise Doctrine in Automobile
Law, 16 Corn. L.Q. 320 (1931); Rollison, The "Joint Enterprise" in the Law
of Imputed Negligence, 6 Notre Dame Law. 172 (1931); Notes, 48 Mich. L. Rev.
372 (1950); 1 Baylor L. Rev. 492 (1949); 48 A.L.R. 1055 (1927); 63 A.L.R. 909
(1929); 80 A.L.R. 312 (1932); 95 A.L.R. 857 (1935); Prosser, Handbook of the
Law of Torts § 65 (1941); Restatement, Torts § 491 (1934); authorities cited
note 2 supra.
Compare Mechem, The Law of Joint Adventure, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 644
(1931) (not dealing with accident cases).
26. Crescent Motor Co. v. Stone, 211 Ala. 516, 101 So. 49 (1924); Straffus
v. Barclay, 147 Tex. 600, 219 S.W.2d 65 (1949); Keeton, Imputed Contributory
Negligence, 13 Texas L. Rev. 161, 163 (1935); Note, 1 Baylor L. Rev. 492 (1949);
Restatement, Torts § 491 (1934).
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27
is in fact concerned almost exclusively with automobile cases;
which is often used in situations more closely akin to the friendly
co-operation between neighbors or members of a family for
mutual benefit, than to typical agency or employment situations ;28

27. See, e.g., Rollison, The "Joint Enterprise" in the Law of Imputed
Negligence, 6 Notre Dame Law 172, 174 (1931); Notes, 33 B.U.L. Rev. 90, 99
(1953); 48 Mich L. Rev. 372 (1950); Restatement, Torts § 491, Comment C
(1934). Cf. 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice §§ 2372,
2494 (Perm. ed. 1946); 38 Am. Jur., Negligence § 249.
28. The requirements for joint enterprise are often said to be a mutual
Interest In the purposes of the venture and a "right of control over other
members in directing that venture." See, e.g., Weintraub, The Joint Enterprise Doctrine in Automobile Law, 16 Corn. L.Q. 320, 325 (1931); Note, 48
Mich L. Rev. 372, 373 (1950); 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and
Practice § 2494 (Perm. ed. 1946). Some courts make the control requirement
fairly narrow and find a right of control only where plaintiff owns the automobile himself, or has joint ownership or possession of it with the driver;
or where the right of control can be pretty clearly spelled out along lines
which have become familiar in conventional agency or partnership situations.
E.g., Bryant v. Pacific Electric Ry., 174 Cal. 737, 164 Pac. 385 (1917) (with
which compare Howard v. Alta Chevrolet Co., 243 P.2d 804 [Cal. App. 1952J);
Coleman v. Bent, 100 Conn. 527, 124 Atl. 224 (1924); Weller v. Fish Transport
Co., 123 Conn. 49, 192 Atl. 317 (1937); Fuller v. Mills, 36 Ga. App. 357, 136 S.E.
807 (1927); Greenwood v. Bridgeways, Inc., 243 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. App. 1951);
Bowley v. Duca, 80 N.H. 548, 120 Atl. 74 (1923); Painter v. Lingon, 193 Va. 840,
71 S.E.2d 355 (1952); Brubaker v. Iowa County, 174 Wis. 574, 183 N.W. 690
(1921). Other courts, however, have gone pretty far along the lines suggested
in the text. E.g., Caliando v. Huck, 84 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Fla. 1949), noted in
48 Mich. L. Rev. 372 (1950); Wentworth v. Waterbury, 90 Vt. 60, 96 Atl. 334
(1916). Cf. Washington & O.D. Ry. v. Zell's Adm'r, 118 Va. 755, 88 S.E. 309
(1916), overruled by Painter v. Lingon supra. The weight of authority favors
the former view. See authorities note 25 supra.
Circumstances may impose a duty to use care to control the conduct of
another. If there is a real chance to exercise control, failure to do so may
then be personal negligence as we have seen. Note 9 supra. Cf. Weintraub,
The Joint Enterprise Doctrine in Automobile Law, 16 Corn. L.Q. 320, 329
(1931); Keeton, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 13 Texas L. Rev. 161, 168
(1935). Beyond this, the "right of control" is a familiar test of an employment or agency relationship. But it is not a satisfactory justification for
vicarious liability, which is imposed not on this basis, but rather on grounds
of public policy "in favor of burdening one who acts through another in
pursuit of his own ends with the injuries incidental to his servant's activities." Weintraub, supra at 335; authorities cited note 1 supra. "Right of control" in this sense is no better justification for imputing negligence to a
plaintiff. And the very grounds of policy which justify vicarious liability of
defendants point away from defeating liability through the defense of contributory negligence. It Is not surprising, therefore, that some recent cases
have refused to find a right of control even in some of the situations mentioned in the first part of this note. Thus the fact that an automobile was
registered in a wife's name was held an insufficient basis for finding that
she might control the husband-driver's conduct while they were together on
an errand for mutual pleasure. Rodgers v. Saxton, 305 Pa. 479, 158 Atl. 166
(1931). Cf. Painter v. Lingon, supra. See also Christensen v. Hennepin Transp.
Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406 (1943); Fox v. Kaminsky, 239 Wis. 559, 2
N.W.2d 199 (1942) (in both of which the errand was the husband's and the
wife-owner went along for company). A like result has been reached where
husband and wife were joint owners and they were "traveling together to
Florida," the husband driving. Jenks v. Veeder Contracting Co., 177 Misc.
240, 30 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct., Albany County 1941), aff'd on this point 264
App. Div. 979, 37 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1942); 290 N.Y. 810, 50 N.E.2d 231 (1943). The
trial court remarked pithily, "the highway would be the wrong place to
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and which is scarcely ever used as a basis for vicarious liability,
but nearly always as a ground for cutting off (by imputed negligence) the claim of an innocent automobile guest against a negligent third person. 29 The doctrine is no better than its unlamented
deceased forerunner, except, perhaps, in situations closely resembling an ad hoc partnership for a business purpose.30
Parent and Minor Child
In 1839 a New York court imputed the negligence of the
father to his two year old son in an action brought on behalf of
the child against a third person whose alleged negligence resulted
in the running down of the child by a sleigh. 31 This was not a
suit for the father's own damage, but he was plaintiff as next
friend of the child. The father's negligence lay in allowing so
young a child on the road unattended. The court gave three
reasons for its ruling: (1) Since the child was too young to be
negligent, "the law must make him responsible, through others,
if the doctrine of mutual care between the parties using the road
is to be enforced at all in his case. '3 2 (2) The care of helpless
children is confided to a guardian who "is keeper and agent for
this purpose," so that the guardian's act must be deemed the
child's as to third persons.3 3 (3) It is much more fit that the
infant should look to his negligent guardian than that a guardian
should "harass [third persons] in courts of justice, recovering
3 4
heavy verdicts for his own misconduct.
Most courts repudiate this position. The child is not, of
course, liable to third persons for his parent's custodial negligence,
make the assertion of a partial right of control." Contra: Archer v. Chicago,
M., St. P. & P. R.R., 215 Wis. 509, 255 N.W. 67 (1935). Compare Mustin v.
West, 46 So.2d 136 (La. App. 1950) .(husband-owner barred by negligence of
wife driver where husband present in car); Waguespack v. Savarese, 13
So.2d 726 (La. App. 1943).
29. Weintraub, Joint Enterprise Doctrine in Automobile Law, 16 Corn.
L.Q. 320, 323 (1931); Note, 1 Baylor L. Rev. 492 (1949); Prosser, Torts 492
(1941).
30. An example is Zajic v. Johnson, 126 Neb. 191, 253 N.W. 77 (1934), where
the seven members of an orchestra bought a car together and were driving
home from an engagement when the accident occurred. Compare Weintraub,
The Joint Enterprise Doctrine in Automobile Law, 16 Corn. L.Q. 320, 334-338
(1931); Note, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 372 (1950); Prosser, Torts 497, 498 (1941);
Note, 48 A.L.R. 1055 (1927). It is not suggested that imputed negligence is
justified in such a case, simply that It is less unjustified than in other cases
of joint enterprise.
31. Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615 (N.Y. 1839).
32. Id. at 619.
33. Ibid.
34. Id. at 620.
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so there is no agency under generally applicable notions;3 5 and
the rule has been generally condemned as harsh and unjustifiable. 3 6 The third reason-that the negligent father is the real
beneficiary of the action-has some merit.3 7 Most courts, however, invoke this reasoning only to bar the parent's own action
(for loss of services, expenses, etc.), and not in the suit for the
child's injury. 38 Few if any jurisdictions still follow the rule in
Hartfield v. Roper;39 it was changed in New York by statute in
4
1935. 0
Husband and Wife
At common law the husband was a necessary plaintiff in a
suit for injuries to the wife and had the right to any proceeds of
judgment. 41 As a natural corollary of this rule the husband's
negligence barred his recovery. 42 This situation is changed by
statute, however, and the great weight of modern authority finds
no basis for imputing the negligence of one spouse to another
merely because of the marital relationship itself. 43 In some states,
35. That is, even if the child could appoint an agent, so as to be held
vicariously liable for the agent's acts. On grounds that are tenable neither
in logic nor in policy this has sometimes been, denied. See, e.g., Palmer v.
Miller, 380 Ill.
256, 43 N.E.2d 973 (1942); Covault v. Nevitt, 157 Wis. 113, 146
N.W. 1115 (1914); Note, 103 A.L.R. 487 (1936). But cf. Carroll v. Harrison, 49

F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Va. 1943), aff'd 139 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1943); Gregory,
Infant's Responsibility for his Agent's Tort, 5 Wis. L. Rev. 453, 458 et seq.
(1930). The reasoning that rejects the infant's vicarious liability may also be
used to prevent negligence from being imputed to him as plaintiff because of
a relationship of agency or joint enterprise. See, e.g., Potter v. Florida
Motor Lines, 57 F.2d 313 (S.D. Fla. 1932); Howe v. Central Vermont Ry., 91
Vt. 485, 101 Atl. 45 (1917). This is another instance of the way in which two
wrong rules may, capriciously, make a right result in law. Here, as elsewhere, the sounder solution is to get rid of both rules and avoid the caprice.
36. Warren v. Manchester St. Ry., 70 N.H. 352, 47 Atl. 735 (1900); Gulessarian v. Madison Rys. Co., 172 Wis. 400, 179 N.W. 573 (1920); Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41 Yale L.J. 831 (1932);
Lessler, The Proposed Discard of the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory
Negligence, 20 Ford. L. Rev. 156, 165 (1951); Note, 33 B.U.L. Rev. 90, 100 (1953).
37. In the eyes of those who do not want to see contributory negligence
pared away. See Gilmore, Imputed Negligence, 1 Wis. L. Rev. 193, 201 (1921).
38. Id. at 258, 259.
39. See cases collected in Note, 15 A.L.R. 414 (1921). This lists Delaware,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New York as following the minority
view. But cf. Brown v. Schendelman, 4 W.W. Harr. 50, 143 Atl. 42 (Del. 1928);
Messick v. Delaware Electric Power Co., 175 Atl. 772 (Del. Super. 1934) (limiting rule); note 40 infra.
40. New York Domestic Relations Law § 73; Massachusetts changed her
rule by statute in 1945. Mass. Gen. L. c. 352, § 85D. See Gill v. Jakstas, 325
Mass. 309, 90 N.E.2d 527 (1950).
41. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Goodenough, 55 N.J.L. 577, 28 Atl. 3 (1893). Cf.
Spiller v. Close, 110 Me. 302, 86 At. 173 (1913) (applying similar principle in
action to recover gambling losses).
42. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Goodenough, 55 N.J.L. 577, 28 Atl. 3 (1893).
43. McCord v. Benford, 48 Ga. App. 738, 173 S.E. 208 (1934); Louisville
N.A. & C. Ry. v. Creek, 130 Ind. 139, 29 N.E. 481 (1892); Vitale v. Checker

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XIV

a right to damages acquired by the wife during marriage must be
sued for by both husband and wife and becomes community
property. Under such a rule the husband's negligence will bar
44
recovery.
Bailor and Bailee
There was a good deal of nineteenth century authority for
imputing the negligence of the bailee to the bailor, so as to defeat
the bailor's recovery against a third person for his negligence in
injuring the subject of the bailment. In some of the earlier cases
the point was assumed, or decided without discussion. 45 In others
it was reasoned: (1) that the bailor had entrusted the goods to
a bailee of his own selection so that against strangers the bailee's
possession was that of his bailor 46 (a kind of assumption of risk);
(2) since either the bailor or the bailee might sue the third
person, the latter's plight should be the same in either suit"... the bailor and bailee must recover, if at all, on the same
facts and under the same circumstances.

' 47

But these reasons are

not convincing. As to the first it may be answered (as it was in
the passenger cases) that the fault principle does not generally
put on a man (make him "assume") the risks of another's negligence where his own conduct has been reasonable and lawful,
and that there is no reason for excepting the case of conduct
which consists in entrusting one's self or one's goods to another
for a legitimate purpose.4 8 To the second reason, it may be said
Cab Co., 166 La. 527, 117 So. 579 (1928); Notes, 59 A.L.R. 153 (1929); 110 A.L.R.
1099 (1937).
For the Connecticut rule, see Lessler, The Proposed Discard of the
Doctrine of Imputed Contributory Negligence, 20 Ford. L. Rev. 156, 167, n. 51
(1951).
44. McFadden v. Santa Ana, 0. & T. St. Ry., 87 Cal. 464, 25 Pac. 681 (1891);
Basler v. Sacramento Gas and Electric Co., 158 Cal. 514, 111 Pac. 530 (1910);
Isaacs v. San Francisco, 73 Cal. App.2d 621, 167 P.2d 221 (1946); Ostheller v.
Spokane & Inland Empire R.R., 107 Wash. 678, 182 Pac. 630 (1919).
But the rule does not make one spouse liable for injuries negligently
caused by the other. Cox v. Kaufman, 77 Cal. App.2d 449, 175 P.2d 260 (1946);
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Wellman, 98 Cal. App. 2d 151, 219 P.2d 506 (1950).
45. E.g., in Smith v, Smith, 2 Pick. 621 (Mass. 1824); Forks Township v.
King, 84 Pa. 230 (1877), it was assumed. In Texas & P. Ry. v. Tankersley, 63
Tex. 57 (1885), it was decided as a point beyond question, without discussion.
46. Puterbaugh v. Reasor, 9 Ohio St. 484 (1859). Cf. Illinois Cent. R. Co.
v. Sims, 77 Miss. 325, 27 So. 527 (1900); Wellwood v. King [1921] 2 Ir. R. 274
(K.B. Div.), rev'd 290 (C.A.).
47. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Sims, 77 Miss. 325, 327, 27 So. 527, 528 (1900).
Cf. Wellwood v. King [1921] 2 Ir. R. 274, 278 (K.B. Div.); Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. v. Starley, 28 Cal.2d 347, 170 P.2d 448 (1946), noted in 34 Calif. L. Rev. 769
(1946); Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41
Yale L.J. 831, 834 et seq. (1932). See also Motorlease Corp. v. Mulroony, 9
N.J. 82, 86 A.2d 765, 767 (1952).
48. Of course, a bailor's negligence may attach to the act of entrusting,
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that the bailor and bailee have each a separate and independent
interest in the property; 49 moreover, in the typical case, the only
real injury is to the bailor's interest, and his suit ought not to be
embarrassed by the fact that, for more or less technical reasons,
the bailee may also sue (and account to his bailor for the proceeds) .5
Without extensive consideration of either of these reasons
the majority of courts saw in the bailment of goods cases an
analogy to passenger cases and followed the both-ways reasoning
and the authority of The Bernina5 and Little v. Hackett52 to
deny the imputation. 8 This rule is applied without distinction to
54
all sorts of situations which the law classifies as bailments,
55
including cases of chattel mortgage and conditional sales.
From what has been said it can be seen that the doctrine of
imputation was once used most effectively to implement and
even extend the defense of contributory negligence. As the
defense itself came increasingly to be thought harsh, however,
it came to be felt that imputation could not be generally justified.
as where the bailee is observably not a fit custodian for goods; but that is a
case where the entruster's own conduct is not reasonable. For discussions,
see Mills v. Armstrong, "The Bernina," 13 App. Cas. 1, 8 (H.L. 1888); Little v.
Hackett, 116 U.S. 366, 379 (1886).
49. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley, 28 Cal.2d 347, 351, 170 P.2d 448,
450 (1946); Motorlease Corp. v. Mulroony, 9 N.J. 82, 90, 86 A.2d 765, 770 (1952)
(dissenting opinion of Vanderbilt, C.J.).
50. 6 Am. Jur., Bailments § 302-310 (1950); 8 C.J.S., Bailments § 56 (1938).
If the situation is one in which the ballee has a separable and recognizable interest (so that he will actually obtain part of the fruits of the action),
there is no compelling reason why his contributory negligence might not be
allowed as a defense pro tanto. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley, 28 Cal.2d
347, 170 P.2d 448 (1946) (where carrier-bailee has paid bailor in full, contributory negligence recognized as defense to bailor's action); Morris Plan
Co. v. Hillcrest Farms Dairy, 323 'Mass. 452, 82 N.E.2d 889 (1948) (suggesting
that conditional vendor's recovery might be limited to unpaid balance on a
conditional sale agreement.)
For the suggestion that both mortgagee and mortgagor of personal
property should join as plaintiffs where each has an interest, see Jolly v.
Thornton, 40 Cal. App.2d 819, 102 P.2d 467 (1940); Note, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 523
(1934).
51. 13 App. Cas. 1 (H.L. 1888).
52. 116 U.S. 366 (1886).
53. E.g., Wellwood v. King [1921) 2 Ir. R. 290 (C.A.) (auto left with garage
for repairs); Currie v. Consolidated Ry., 81 Conn. 383, 71 Atl. 356 (1908)
(rented vehicle); Cain v. Wickens, 81 N.H. 99, 122 Ati. 800 (1923) (loaned
automobile); New York, L.E. & W. R. Co. v. New Jersey Electric Ry., 60
N.J.L. 338, 38 Atl. 828 (1897) (rented vehicle).
See cases collected in Notes, 6 A.L.R. 316 (1920); 30 A.L.R. 1248 (1924).
54. Note the diverse types mentioned in notes 49-52 supra. The rule would
also apply where the goods are in a carrier's or warehouseman's possession.
55. Morris Plan Co. v. Hillcrest Farms Dairy, Inc., 323 Mass. 452, 82
N.E.2d 889 (1948); Lacey v. Great No. R. Co., 70 Mont. 346, 225 Pac. 808 (1924);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Satterthwaite, 107 N.J.L. 17, 150 Atl. 235 (1930),
aff'd 108 N.J.L. 188, 154 Atl. 769 (1931). Cf. Note, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 523 (1934).
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So it waned, except where negligence was imputed by rules of
general and well accepted application-that is, where there was
vicarious liability. In this development, and as long as there
were vestiges of the older, harsher rules, the both-ways test was
the vehicle for humane law reform. It had in addition the strong
psychological appeal of all rules cast in the form of balanced
and logical symmetry-witness the recurrence of the "mutuality"
concept in our law. 56 Small wonder then that its acceptance was
almost universal two decades ago when it became ensconced in
the Restatement. 57 There were those, however, who pointed out
that "Courts seem unaware that the policies involved in granting
or denying the defensive plea may be different from those controlling the responsibility in damages of a master for the conduct
of his servant, and that the latter are probably concerned simply
58
with providing a financially responsible defendant.
Even as the last traces of the older imputation of contributory negligence (beyond the scope of vicarious liability) were
vanishing, the seriousness and growth of the automobile accident
problem and the plight of uncompensated accident victims5 9 led to
increasing pressure for providing financially responsible defendants. One response to this pressure was the extension of vicarious liability by the court-made "family purpose" doctrine and by
statutes having similar (or broader) effect. Some of the latter,
for example, imposed vicarious liability on automobile owners
for the neeligence of anyone operating the car with the owner's
consent. This represented a departure from the fault principle
so as to impose liability on innocent parties for reasons similar
to those leading to workmen's compensation-the owners were
56. See, e.g., Stone, The "Mutuality" Rule in New York, 16 Col. L. Rev.
443 (1916) (mutuality of remedy in specific performance); Cox, Res Adjudicata: Who Entitled to Plead, 9 Va. L. Reg.(N.S.) 241 (1923) (mutuality of
estoppel of judgment).
57. Restatement, Torts § 485 (1934). See also Note, 17 Corn. L.Q. 158
(1931).
58. Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41
Yale L.J. 831. 833 (1932). See also Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of
Plaintiff's Wife or Child in an Action for Loss of Services, etc., 2 U. of Chi.
L. Rev. 173 (1935).
59. Report by the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile
Accidents to the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social
Sciences (1932); Corstvet, The Uncompensated Accident and Its Consequences, 3 Law & Contemp. Prob. 466 (1936); Grad, Recent Developments in
Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 Col. L. Rev. 300 (1950); McNiece and
Thornton, Automobile Accident Prevention and Compensation, 27 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 585 (1952).
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better distributors of the risks which their lawful activities created than were their victims. 60
Under these statutory and judicial rules expanding vicarious liability beyond the scope of the older law, the question soon
arose whether negligence should be imputed to a plaintiff on the
same new wider basis. Should the bailee's negligence be imputed
to his bailor, or the son's to the father, when the bailor or father
sues a negligent third person for damage to the automobile? The
formal logic of the both-ways test would give an affirmative
answer, and some courts6' and one legislature 62 have imputed the
negligence on this basis. But this leads to the paradox that a
rule which departed from the common law in response to an urge
towards wider liability is being used to curtail liability by expanding the scope of a defense to it. Courts that have perceived this
difficulty have re-evaluated the both-ways test. Some of them
have found that it lacks validity in this context wherein it would
serve as a vehicle of reaction rather than reform. 63 As the Minnesota court has said, "The very reason for holding the consenting
owner liable for negligence of the operator of his automobile, that
of furnishing financial responsibility to an injured party, is
completely absent in the owner's action to recover for damages"
done to his car by a negligent third party. 64 Another purpose of
60. See Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228 Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711, 11 A.L.R.2d 1429
(and note at 1437) (1949); Note, 17 Corn. L.Q. 158 (1931).
61. National Trucking & Storage Co. v. Driscoll, 64 A.2d 304 (D.C. Mun.
Ct. App. 1949); Secured Finance Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 207 Iowa 1105,
224 N.W. 88 (1929); Dileo v. Dumontier, 195 So. 74 (La. App. 1940).
62. California. See note 71 infra.
63. Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228 Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711, 11 A.L.R.2d 1429
(1949); Nannes v. Ideal Garage, 150 Misc. 522, 269 N.Y. Supp. 777 (1934);
Mills v. Gabriel, 284 N.Y. 755, 31 N.E.2d 512 (1940).
64. Christensen v. Hennepin Transportation Co., 215 Minn. 394, 413, 10
N.W.2d 406, 417 (1943); Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228 Minn. 201, 205, 36 N.W.2d 711,
714 (1949).
An excellent note has put it: "Although [the owner's] negligence has
been no greater than that of an employer under the Workman's Compensation Acts, the same economic considerations apply [to make him liable]. But
no such considerations are present when the borrower and the third person
have both been negligent, and it is the owner who is suing." 17 Corn. L.Q.
158, 164 (1931).
See also the admirable analysis in Gregory, The Contributory Negligence
of Plaintiff's Wife or Child in an Action for Loss of Services, etc., 2 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 173 (1935).
The Jacobsen case involved the collision of two cars, each driven by the
owner's son. Plaintiff sued for damage to his car and defendant counterclaimed for his damage. The court upheld an instruction that if both sons
were negligent, both fathers could recover. Cf. Bandych v. Ross, 26 N.Y.S.2d
830 '(City Ct. Utica 1941); Note, 17 Corn. L.Q. 158 (1931). The court also
upheld a refusal to instruct that if both sons were negligent the verdict
should be for the one suffering the greater damage and for only the difference between the amounts of damage suffered. It is submitted that this
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such statutes is to induce care by car owners in selecting persons
to whom they entrust the car. But probably the liability which
the statute imposes on the owner is the strongest incentive to
that end, and little will be added to it by cutting the innocent
owner off from recovery for his own property damage.6 5
The rejection of the both-ways test under owner's consent
statutes raises the question whether it has any validity at all.
The whole doctrine of vicarious liability stems from considerations other than the defendant's personal fault, for it assumes
his innocence. Indeed, the most widely accepted justification
today rests all vicarious liability on bases essentially like those
66
which underlie its recent extension in the consent statutes.
And these considerations furnish no fairer basis for cutting off
an innocent plaintiff's recovery here than they do in the case of
bailments. If the principle of liability or disability for individualized fault is taken as the norm, and vicarious liability or disability
is regarded as an exceptional solution (to be justified only for
reasons of policy sufficient in each case to warrant the exception)
then there would be little justification indeed for imputing negligence to an innocent plaintiff in most cases.
A possible justification may be suggested where the risk of
loss to property is a recurring and calculable one in the owner's
business. The owner of a fleet of trucks or buses, or of automobiles for rent, or of automobiles on conditional sale, would
furnish examples. In such a case the owner typically makes
provision for distributing this property loss-by insurance or
otherwise-whether it is caused by the servant's or the bailee's
negligence or not. Where that is the case the loss is at once put
into channels for its wide distribution without resort to the relatively inefficient method of tort liability; and society may well
lose rather than gain from any step which would encourage the
refusal was eminently sound. If the fathers were covered by liability insurance, the rejected instruction would allow the insurance companies to credit
the personal loss of the insureds against their liability as insurers. Compare
James, Contributory Negligence, 62 Yale L.J. 691, 734 (1953). If they were
not so covered, there is no need for the refused instruction.
In the case put, this possibility may be avoided by suits against the sons
(bailees) rather than the fathers. If the insurance policies are in the usual

form, they will cover the sons' liabilities as well as those of the insured
owners.
65. Except possibly in the case of an individual owner who has liability

but not collision insurance.
66. See, e.g., Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 Yale L.J. 105
(1916); Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 Col. L. Rev. 444, 716 (1923); Douglas,
Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 Yale L.J. 584, 720 (1929);

James, Vicarious Liability (to be published in 28 Tulane L. Rev. ...

[1954]).
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cumbersome attempts to pursue the matter further in the hope
of getting a nicer adjustment to an illusory concept of fault.
That pursuit puts additional burdens on our already overworked
judicial machinery; and it often lets good loss distributors throw
some of their losses on individuals who cannot distribute them
at all.6 7 A rule of imputed negligence would deter professional

bailors (or their insurers) from making this quest (so costly to
society) and would effectively encourage the practice of insurance to cover the property loss incident to these transactions.
Such considerations might lead to adopting Gregory's suggestion
that bailments should not all be treated alike for this purpose.
In distinguishing between classes of bailments, he would make
controlling "the risk of probable injury taken by the bailor."6
It is submitted that a better basis for distinction would be the
likelihood that bailors of a certain class would insure or otherwise make regular provision for the loss, and the desirability of
putting upon them pressure for making such provision.6 9 Similar
considerations might justify the imputation of negligence to
employers of labor (as the present rule does).
It should be noted that the foregoing reasoning would not
justify the both-ways test. Rather it would lead to denying
imputation in some situations where there is vicarious liability
(as with the individual lender of an automobile under the owners'
consent statutes); and imputing negligence in other cases where
there was not vicarious liability (as in the case of professional
bailors). Perhaps it is unlikely that the waning defense of contributory negligence ° will enjoy much belated expansion, even
for reasons like these.71 On the other hand it should be noted
67. Compare James, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1156 (1941); James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 537, 559

(1952).
68. Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41
Yale L.J. 831, 841-2 (1932). Cf. Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of
Plaintiff's Wife or Child in an Action for Loss of Services, etc., 2 U. of Chi.
L. Rev. 173 (1935).
69. See Ehrenzweig, Assurance Oblige-A Comparative Study, 15 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 445 (1950).
70. See Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 Ark.
L. Rev. 1 (1946).
71. In this connection, however, two recent statutes should be noted.
The California owner's consent statute expressly provides for imputed negligence. Deering's Cal. Vehicle Code Ann. § 402 (1935, 1937, 1943, 1949, 1951).
Milgate v. Wraith, 19 Cal.2d 297, 121 P.2d 10 (1942); Spendlove v. Pacific
Electric Ry., 30 Cal.2d 632, 184 P.2d 873 (1947). And a 1939 New Jersey
statute provides for imputed negligence in all cases of bailment (expressly
Including conditional sales). 46 N.J. Stat. Ann. c. 36, § 1; Motorlease Corp. v.
Mulroony, 9 N.J. 82, 86 A.2d 765 (1952). Is it more than a coincidence that
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that most of the claims that are barred by imputed contributory
negligence today are property damage claims by parties who
employ labor and are likely to provide for property damage claims
in the way described. Such losses do not pose the social problem
or build up the same pressures for redress that personal injuries
and death have. So it is not unlikely that the imputed negligence
may remain where it is now entrenched, save possibly in the field
of "joint enterprise."
All of the situations we have been considering have involved
a claim against someone who is an outsider to the relationship
which gives rise to the imputation of negligence. The great
weight of authority confines the doctrine of imputed negligence
to such situations, and refuses to impute the defendant's negligence to the plaintiff when the action is, for example, by master
72
against servant, or by one joint entrepreneur against another.
There is no shadow of excuse for the minority rule, and it is
probably nothing more than a judicial faux pas.
There is another situation which is similar (but not identical)
in operation and result to the imputation of another's negligence
to the plaintiff, but which is analyzed differently under the legal
reasoning currently in vogue. Where a wife or minor child is
injured a right of action accrues to the husband or parent for
loss of services, and expenses, and sometimes other items, while
the wife or child has a right of action for pain, suffering, disfigurement, and so on, arising out of the same injury. Under the
prevailing rule in this country, the negligence of the wife or
child will bar the husband's or the parent's action (for the items
above enumerated), even under circumstances where the injured
person's negligence will not be imputed to the husband- or parentplaintiff. 73 If, for example, a son has borrowed his father's dress
clothes and car to go to a dance and negligently collides with
New Jersey, which was one of the first states to reject the imputation of
negligence from bailee to bailor, was apparently content with the prevailing
rule until a few years after it was applied to the conditional vendor of an
automobile?
72. Whidden v. Malone, 220 Ala. 220, 124 So. 516 (1929); Bushnell v.
Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925); Bostrom v. Jennings, 326 Mich.
146, 40 N.W.2d 97 (1949) (disapproving former holdings to the contrary and
indicating they were ill-considered); Johnson v. Hetrick, 300 Pa. 225, 150 Atl.
477 (1930); Campbell v. Campbell, 104 Vt. 468, 162 Atl. 379 (1932); O'Brien v.
Woldson, 149 Wash. 192, 270 Pac. 304 (1928); cases collected in Notes, 62 A.L.R.
440, 442 (1929); 85 A.L.R. 630, 632 (1933). Cf. Kimbro v. Holladay, 154 So. 368
(La. App. 1934), where no joint enterprise was found, but the present point
apparently went unnoticed.
73. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Honey, 12 C.C.A. 190, 27 U.S. App. 196, 63 Fed.
39 (1894), reversing judgment 59 Fed. 423, 7 Am. Neg. Cas. 556 (1893).
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another negligently driven car, the son's negligence will not
affect the father's action for damage to the clothes or the car (at
least if it is not a "family car") but it will bar the father's action
for loss of services and expenses incurred because of his son's
personal injury.7 4 These discrepant results suggest inconsistency.
It remains to consider: (1) what legal doctrine is used to justify
the distinction between them; (2) whether the justification is
sufficient as a matter of either logic or policy, and (3) if not,
which rule should prevail.
It is generally said today that the husband's or parent's claim
for services, etc., is a "derivative" one, and stands no better than
it would in the hands of the injured person from whom it was
derived. 75 Now there are situations in our law where a claim
originally was in one party, who had a right to sue upon it, but
then passed to another, by operation of law or voluntary transfer.
Suits by assignees or representatives of decedents' estates, and
derivative stockholders' actions, are examples., In these situations
plaintiff's case generally does have all the infirmities it had while
in the hands of the original owner. And one of the leading modern cases espousing the rule now in question invokes the assignment analogy. 76 But it is a weak one. The claim for loss of
services never did belong to the injured party, any more than
did the claims for damage to the clothes or the car 77 in the case
put above. The law gives the husband or parent an independent
claim from the very moment of the injury which the wife or
the child never could sue on, or destroy by settlement or judgment, or assign.
The claim for services, then, is not a derivative one in the
ordinary sense. Nor has it been treated as derivative for other
purposes. Thus, as Gregory points out, a woman's consent to her
seduction or her debilitation by drugs will bar her own action
for injuries sustained, but not the action of her husband for loss of
services and companionship and for medical expenses. 78 In terms
74. If the case were one of imputed negligence (e.g., agency), the son's
negligence would bar the father's action for any and all items of damage.
75. Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376, 206 N.W. 198, 42 A.L.R.

712 (and note at 717) (1925); Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts § 149
(1933).
76. Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376, 206 N.W. 198, .42 A.L.R.
712 (1925).
77. Indeed even less, since the bailee's interest in the subject of the bailment will support an action on his part for the whole damage. Armstrong v.
Kubo & Co., 88 Cal. App. 331, 263 Pac. 365 (1928); Central R.R. v. Bayway
Refining Co., 81 N.J.L. 456, 79 Atl. 292 (1911).
78. Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or Child in
an Action for Loss of Services, etc., 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 173, 188, 189 (1935).
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of logic the assignment analogy does not seem as close as the
analogy of bailment. 79 If one insists on thinking conceptually,
he may conceive of the wife or child as carrying around with him
the husband's or parent's pecuniary interest (in potential services
and freedom from medical expense) as though it were a jacket,
or a necklace, or a wig. On a more realistic level is the owner's
relatively greater practical chance for control and selection in
the case of bailees than of families. In the case put, for instance,
the father presumably had less control over who or what his son
would be than he had over the matter of lending him his clothes
and his car on this occasion. One possible ground for imputing
a bailee's negligence is therefore even weaker where the parent's
or husband's independent claim for loss of services is involved.
Altogether there seems to be no warrant in either doctrine or
policy for treating the two cases differently-at least to the disadvantages of the claim for loss of services, etc. Nor does there
seem to be any adequate basis for barring the innocent owner of
this claim (which the law gives as correlative to duties it imposes) for the negligence of another than the plaintiff, whether
the process is called imputation or something else.
If the husband- or parent-plaintiff has himself been negligent,
that fact will of course affect his recovery for loss of services,
etc. 0 Moreover, questions may arise as to whether the negligence
of a third person (e.g., a custodian of his child) will be imputed
to him. Such questions are parallel to those involving imputation
of negligence to the beneficiary under a wrongful death statute,
and will be treated below. 8 '
It is a commonplace, of course, that under Anglo-American
common law of the early nineteenth century a right of action for
personal injury did not survive the victim's death, and no civil
action accrued to anyone on account of his death.8 2 This situation
79. Indeed, in an earlier day when the bailee's negligence was imputed
to the bailor, this analogy was used in a leading case to support the defense
of the wife's contributory negligence to the husband's claim. Chicago, B. & Q.
R. Co. v. Honey, 12 C.C.A. 190, 27 U.S. App. 196, 63 Fed. 39 (1894), reversing
judgment 59 Fed. 423, 7 Am. Neg. Cas. 556 (1893).
The analogy is surely no less apt now that the rule in bailments is

reversed.
80. Pratt Iron & Coal Co. v. Brawley, 83 Ala. 371, 3 So. 555 (1888); Kokesh
v. Price, 136 Minn. 304, 161 N.W. 715 (1917); Conway v. Monidah Trust, 52
Mont. 244, 157 Pac. 178 (1916).
81. See p. 358 et seq. infra.
82. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Campb. 493 (N.P. 1808); Schumacher, Rights of
Action under Death and Survival Statutes, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 114 (1924);
Oppenheim, The Survival of Tort Actions and the Action for Wrongful
Death-A Survey and a Proposal, 16 Tulane L. Rev. 386 (1942); Voss, The
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has everywhere been remedied, in one way or another, by statute. 3 Some of the statutes, following the original English model
of Lord Campbell's Act,8 4 create a new cause of action for the
benefit of those suffering pecuniary damage from the wrongful
death.8 5 Others provide that the right of action of the party
injured shall survive.8 6 Some of these survival statutes provide
for the recovery of damages resulting from the death, as well as
for damages on account of pain, suffering and economic loss, if
any, suffered by the decedent before death.87 Other jurisdictions
have both a wrongful death statute (covering the loss to beneficiaries from the death) and a survival statute (covering damage suffered by decedent before death).ss
Under all of these types of statutes the contributory negligence of the deceased is a bar to an action for negligently causing
his death or injury. Where the statute provides for the survival
of his action, the surviving action is derivative in the fullest
sense of the term, and the result of the cases comes as near to
being demanded by inexorable logic as anything does.89 Where a
new right' of action is created, the statute often provides for recovRecovery of Damages for Wrongful Death at Common Law, at Civil Law,
and in Louisiana, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 201, 203-212 (1932); Tiffany, Death by
Wrongful Act c. 1 (2d ed. 1913).
83. Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act xix-lxxi, c. 3 (2d ed. 1913), contains
a comparative analytical table and a summary of the principal statutes.
84. 9 and 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846).
85. Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act § 24 (2d ed. 1913), lists 34 states and
the District of Columbia as having a statute of this type. Examples are Art.
2315, La. Civil Code of 1870; New York Decedent Estates Law § 130. The
Louisiana statute originally provided only for the survival of the deceased's
own action. Earhart v. New Orleans & Carrollton R. Co., 17 La. Ann. 243
(1865). The wrongful death provision was added in 1884. See Voss, The
Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Death at Common Law, at Civil Law,
and in Louisiana, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 201 (1932).
86. Schumacher, Rights of Action under Death and Survival Statutes, 23
Mich. L. Rev. 114, 116 (1924); Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act § 25 (2d ed.
1913). An example is to be found in 41 Iowa Code Ann. §§ 611.20-611.22 (1950).
See Jones, Civil Liability for Wrongful Death in Iowa, 10 Iowa L. Bull. 169
(1925); 11 Iowa L. Rev. 28 (1925).
87. Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act § 26 (2d ed. 1913). See Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 45 A.2d 789 (1946); Jones, Civil Liability for Wrongful
Death in Iowa, 10 Iowa L. Bull. 169 (1925); 11 Iowa L. Rev. 28 (1925).
88. St. Louis & Iron Mtn. Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915) (FELA);
Farrington v. Stoddard, 115 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1940) (Maine statutes); Eichorn
v. New Orleans & C.R. Light & Power Co., 112 La. 236, 36 So. 335 (1904);
Voss, The Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Death at Common Law, at
Civil Law, and in Louisiana, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 201, 223-226 (1932).
An extensive review of the American" statutes may be found in Coliseum
Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105 (1931).
89. Quinn v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 56 Conn. 44, 12 Atl. 97 (1887);
Lane v. Central Iowa Ry., 69 Iowa 443, 29 N.W. 419 (1886); Vitale v. Checker
Cab Co., 7 La. App. 653 (1927); 166 La. 527, 117 So. 579 (1928); Oppenheim,
The Survival of Tort Actions and the Action for Wrongful Death-A Survey
and a Proposal, 16 Tulane L. Rev. 386, 417 (1942).
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ery on the express condition that deceased could have maintained
an action for the wrong "if death had not ensued," and such a statute, too, seems to demand the result of the cases. 90 Other wrongful
death statutes have been interpreted as though they contained
such a provision, though in fact they do not.91 These last decisions might well have gone the other way, since the action is not
truly a derivative one and there is no basis for imputing the
deceased's negligence to his defendants. 92 It is unlikely, however,
that the decisions will be reversed at this late date.
Wherever the negligence of a third person would have been
imputed to the deceased (if he had sued for his own injuries),
that imputed negligence will be imputed to the deceased in an
action for his death. The discussion in the earlier part of this
98
article is therefore applicable to such a situation.
A question is also presented where a beneficiary has been
negligent. Under survival statutes this is generally held to be
immaterial.9 4 Under wrongful death statutes, however, the negligence of a sole beneficiary in many states bars his recovery for
the wrongful death of another (even where deceased could have
maintained an action for his injuries if death had not ensued).95
90. Lord Campbell's Act itself contains such a provision. See also, e.g.,
New York Decedent Estates Law § 130.
91. This is the case in Louisiana. See Vitale v. Checker Cab Co., 7 La. App.
653 (1927); 166 La. 527, 117 So. 579 (1928). See also Prosser, Torts 423 (1941).
92. The court of appeal in the VitaZe case made the distinction suggested
in the text, and the Supreme Court was troubled by the apparent inconsistency between awarding the widow damages for her personal injury and
withholding damages in her action arising out of her husband's death, but
decided to follow the prevailing rule. See comments in Oppenheim, The
Survival of Tort Actions and the Action for Wrongful Death-A Survey and
a Proposal, 16 Tulane L. Rev. 386, 417 (1942).
93. Thus the parent's or custodian's negligence will not be imputed to a
child who has been killed as a result of it. Atlanta & C. Air-Line Ry. v.
Gravitt, 93 Ga. 369, 20 S.E. 550 (1894); Bamberger v. Citizens' St. R. Co., 95
Tenn. 18, 31 S.W. 163 (1895). The rule was otherwise in New York and other
states following Hartfleld v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615 (N.Y. 1839). Carr v. Merchants' Ice Co., 91 App. Div. 162, 86 N.Y. Supp. 368 (1904). But now that
Hartfield has been superseded by statute (New York Domestic Relations
Law § 73), the custodian's negligence will no longer be imputed to the
deceased child. Meyer v. Inguaggiato, 258 App. Div. 331, 16 N.Y.S.2d 672
(1940).
94. Wilmot v. McPadden, 78 Conn. 276, 61 Atl. 1069 (1905); Wymore v.
Mahaska County, 78 Iowa 396, 43 N.W. 264 (1889); Westerfield v. Levis, 43 La.
Ann. 63, 9 So. 52 (1891) (distinguishing damages for wrongful death from
those on account of the deceased's own suffering, etc., in this respect).
Warren v. Manchester St. Ry., 70 N.H. 352, 47 At]. 735 (1900). But see Niemi
v. Boston & M. R.R., 87 N.H. 1, 9, 173 Atl. 361, 175 Atl. 245 (1934) (overruling
Warren v. Manchester); Crevelli v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 98 Wash.
42, 167 Pac. 66 (1917).
95. Peoples v. Seamon, 249 Ala. 284, 31 So.2d 88 (1947); Burton v. Spurlock,
294 Ky. 336, 171 S.W.2d 1012 (1943); Wise v. Eubanks, 159 So. 161 (La. App.
1935); cases collected in Note, 2 A.L.R.2d 785, 788 et seq. (1948). A contrary
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Moreover, if there are more beneficiaries than one, some of these
states will reduce any recovery by the amount of the negligent
beneficiary's share.9 6 Where the negligence of a beneficiary becomes material under such a rule, questions arise as to when the
negligence of another will be imputed to him. These questions
are, as we have noted, parallel to those involving the possible
imputation of a third person's negligence to a husband- or parentplaintiff in his action for loss of services, etc., of his wife or child.
For the most part, such questions are solved along lines described
earlier in this article. Some especially severe rules have crept in,
however, where the negligence is that of the custodian of a child
who has been killed or injured. Where the custodian is acting
in the scope of his employment by a parent, the case falls within
well defined concepts.9 7 But even where there is no vicarious
responsibility under general principles, some decisions have imputed the custodian's negligence to one98 or both parents99 or the
negligence of one parent (who was acting as custodian) to the
result is reached in New York. McKay v. Syracuse Rapid Transit Co., 208

N.Y. 359, 101 N.E. 885 (1913); Zinman v. Newman, 51 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1942).
Where the statute requires the action to be brought by the personal
representative, the question of his negligence is immaterial, under any rule,
unless he is also the beneficiary. It is the beneficiary's negligence that is
significant. Peoples v. Seamon, supra; Burton v. Spurlock, supra; Note,
2 A.L.R.2d 785, 791 et seq. (1948).
96. There are three rules. Some courts will bar all beneficiaries if any of
them is negligent. Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Motor Bus Co., 310 Ill. 38,
141 N.E. 392 (1923). Other courts refuse to bar any beneficiary unless all are
negligent. Herrell v. St. Louis-S.F. R. Co., 324 Mo. 38, 23 S.W.2d 102 (1929).
The majority of states will bar recovery on behalf of any beneficiary who
has been negligent. Phillips v. Denver City T. Co., 53 Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460
(1912); Kokesh v. Price, 136 Minn. 304, 161 N.W. 715 (1917); cases collected in
Note, 2 A.L.R.2d 785, 799 et seq. (1948).
97. This may account for such rulings as Schlenk's Adm'r v. Central
Pass. Ry., 15 Ky. L. Rep. 409, 23 S.W. 589 (1893) (custodian was 12 year old
girl employed by parents as nurse); Niemi v. Boston & M. R. Co., 87 N.H. 1, 9,
173 Atl. 361, 175 Atl. 245 (1934) (wife-owner of car being driven by husband);
Richmond F. & P. R. Co. v. Martin's Adm'r, 102 Va. 201, 45 S.E. 894 (1903)
(father put 11 year old son in charge of wagon to drive mother and daughters to city).
98. Pratt Coal & Iron Co. v. Brawley, 83 Ala. 371, 3 So. 555 (1888) (grandmother's negligence imputed to father); Atlanta & C. Air-Line Ry. v. Gravitt,
93 Ga. 369, 20 S.E. 550 (1894) (child in uncle's custody; uncle's negligence
bars father who has legal custody, but not mother); Conway v. Monidah
Trust, 52 Mont. 244, 157 Pac. 178 (1916) (custodian's negligence bars father's
action for services, but not child's own action); Bamberger v. Citizens' St. R.
Co., 95 Tenn. 18, 31 S.W. 163 (1895) (child left with grandmother who temporarily put custody in her daughter; latter's negligence imputed to parent).
Cf. Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v. Martin's Adm'r, 102 Va. 201, 45 S.E. 894 (1903).
99. Gress v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 228 Pa. 482, 77 Atl. 810 (1910) (6 year
old boy and older sister on way home from school; sister's negligence
imputed to parents); Nettles v. Southern Ry., 211 S.C. 187, 44 S.E.2d 321
(1947) (young child and 8 year old cousin sent to store; cousin's negligence
imputed to parents).
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other parent.10 0 Such rulings stand on as shaky a footing as
Thorogood v. Bryan and Hartfield v. Roper: they are altogether
indefensible, and are being increasingly rejected.' 0 '
100. Keena v. United Railroads of San Francisco, 57 Cal. App. 124, 207
Pac. 35 (1922) (but see note 101 infra); Toner's Adm'r v. South Covington &
C. St. R. Co., 109 Ky. 41, 58 S.W. 439 (1900); Emerine v. Ford, 254 S.W.2d 938
(Ky. 1953); Niemi v. Boston & M. R. Co., 87 N.H. 1, 173 Atl. 261, 175 Atl. 245
(1934); Darbrinsky v. Pennsylvania Co., 248 Pa. 503, 94 Atl. 269 (1915); Smith
v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 173 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1949) (applying Pennsylvania law); Nichols v. Nashville H.A., 187 Tenn. 683, 216 S.W.2d 694 (1949);
Crevelli v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 98 Wash. 42, 167 Pac. 66 (1917). Cf.
Milliken v. Weybosset Pure Food Mkt., 71 R.I. 312, 44 A.2d 723 (1945).
101. Flores v. Brown, 233 P.2d 168 (Cal. App. 1951), 39 Cal.2d 622, 248 P.2d
922 (1952); Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Co., 53 Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460
(1912); Illingworth v. Madden, 135 Me. 159, 192 Atl. 273 (1937); Love v.
Detroit, J. & C. R. Co., 170 Mich. 1, 135 N.W. 963 (1912); Reynolds v. Thompson, 215 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1948); Macdonald v. O'Reilly, 45 Ore. 589, 78 Pac.
753 (1904).
The Flores case overrules the oft-cited Keena case, so that one spouse is
no longer regarded as the agent of the other to care for the child. If both
parents are living together, however, any recovery for the wrongful death
of their child is community property, so that the negligence of either will
bar recovery. Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 622, 630, 631, 248 P.2d 922, 926 (1952).
That notion was inapplicable to Flores, however, since the negligent parent
was also killed in the accident.

